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Chapter 3
BANKING AND FINANCIAL
MATTERS ON CROATIA’S
ROAD TO THE EUROPEAN UNION
Velimir Šonje
Raiffeisenbank Austria
Zagreb
ABSTRACT
The ability of a country to meet the criteria for financial conver-
gence on the EU depends on four key factors: the behaviour and struc-
ture of the banks and non-banking financial service providers, the
degree of development of the money and capital markets, the regulato-
ry environment and the openness of the country to international finan-
cial currents. In this work the factors that work in favour of a rapid
accession by Croatia to the EU and those that are the key areas of vul-
nerability on the same road are identified. The first group of factors
includes the developmental level of the banking system, whose struc-
tural characteristics (competitiveness, ownership structure and scope
of financial mediation) work in favour of rapid integration. This group
also includes the standardising regulatory framework, the changes in
which over the last few years have brought Croatia very close to the
standards of the EU. Non-banking financial service providers are rela-
tively undeveloped; however, where the investment and pensions
funds are concerned, their development and the regulatory environ-
ment, rapidly converging on international standards, guarantee immi-
nent ability to be included in the integration processes. The main areas
of vulnerability are the undeveloped share capital market and a restric-
tive attitude with respect to international financial flows.
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INTRODUCTION
The financial issues on some country’s road towards the EU are
usually brought down to those of whether the country is converging in
terms of the quantitative criteria of Maastricht (amount of inflation, inter-
est rates, public debt, fiscal deficit, currency stability). Sometimes the issue
of the harmonisation of the standards with the legislation of the EU is high-
lighted. However, the most essential capacity of a certain country to meet
the financial and associated standardising parameters of the EU depends
primarily on the structure and behaviour of its institutions: the behaviour
and structure of banks and non-banking financial services or institutions,
the degree to which the money and capital market is developed; the regu-
latory environment and the openness of the country to international finan-
cial flows. In this paper we shall show that Croatia has the characteristics
of an advanced country in connection with most of these criteria. A con-
siderable lag can be noticed in the area of the development of the capital
market and openness to international financial flows, which might in the
future turn out to be serious sources of vulnerability in the process of
Croatia’s accession to the EU.
BEHAVIOUR AND STRUCTURE OF
FINANCIAL SERVICES
The figures in Table 1 show a comparison of long-term interest
rates in Croatia and in other transitional countries. Although the Maastricht
criteria would tend to require a comparison of interest rates on long-term
government bonds, the long-term interest rates on commercial bank loans
shown in the paper demonstrate the ability of the banking system to medi-
ate between the demand for and supply of financial resources, which
belongs to the group of convergence criteria that are not measured by an
unambiguously defined indicator. In spite of this, the competitiveness of
the entire financial services sector is interpreted as an important structural
precondition for EU membership. 
Long-term interest rates in Croatian banks were greater than those
in the Czech banks (among the transitional banks) as recently as the end
of 2000. As against the average in the EMU, there was at that time a still
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Country 2000 June 2002
Czech R. 8.1 6.6
Hungary 13.4 10.5
Polanda 21.4 13.8
Slovakia 9.6 9.8
Slovenia 18.4 15.5
EU 6.2 5.9
Croatia 9.3 7.1
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large 3 percentage points. Then the reduction of interest rates occurred,
and they continued to converge on the European level. In the middle of
2002, these rates were almost completely the same as the Czech rates.
They were larger than those in the EMU by only slightly more than one
percentage point.
Table 1. Long-term interest rates charged by commercial banks on loans (%)
Criterion Criterion Criterion Long-term
met in expected to be trend
2001 met in 2002 or 2003
Inflation no yes good
Interest rate no yes good
Exchange rate yes yes good
Budgetary deficit no no cannot be estimated*
Public debt yes* yes* cannot be estimated*
If one factors in the fact that inflation in Croatia is converging on
EU criteria and that the trends in the exchange rate can already be inter-
preted as harmonisation with EU criteria (see Mihaljek’s paper in this
collection), fiscal issues remain the only really open financial questions
on Croatia’s road to the EU (Table 2). We shall not offer any separate
debate on fiscal indicators here since they are handled in detail in the
chapter of Mihaljek.
Table 2. Summary view of the outlook for meeting the Maastricht criteria
Source: HNB
* The methodological discrepancy of the fiscal accounts, especially of the accounts of the
quasi-budgetary corporations such as HAC, Croatian Motorways, and the quasi-budget-
ary funds after 2000, and the failure to be up to date in the publication of the fiscal sta-
tistics (from August 2002 only the data from April were publicly available), make every
attempt to estimate a long-term trend inadequately serious. Since the long-term trends in
the public debt depend on the long-term trends in the budgetary deficit, the long-term
trend of the public debt cannot be estimated, although its current level (around 40% of
GDP, if government guarantees are not included, and more than 50% if they are) is still
considerably below the level allowed according to the Maastricht criteria (60% of GDP).
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The measurable financial parameters should be looked at as the
surface structure indicators of deep level power relations in society,
which are reflected in the relations in the financial system. It is prima-
rily the quality of institutions and the ability or inability of society to
distinguish good and bad solutions in the creation of its economic and
social policy that affect these relationships. These lines of force can be
read off in the manner of regulating and running central banking, in the
manner of regulating and running banking business operations. For this
reason, in the sequel, there will be a brief discussion of the standard
parameters that have to be satisfied on the road to the EU.
As for central banking, the independence of the central bank
charged with the preservation of price stability is one of the fundamen-
tal principles of the Maastricht agreement. European institutions with
justice insist on this rule, and recent attempts at changing existing laws
in the central banks in the Polish and Hungarian parliaments created a
fairly stormy reaction from the ECB.i Once again one should recall here
that these are conditions that are more stringent than those that held
good for countries like Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland in their EU
accession processes. These states mainly adjusted the legislation gov-
erning central banking during the process of the formation of the EMU,
that is, after they had already become members of the EU. Apart from
that, today’s applicant countries are faced with respecting a rigid stan-
dard. This fact need not be interpreted as the consequence of the delib-
erate application of double standards by the EU for applicant countries.
The greater degree of stringency employed today is the consequence of
the degree of finish and the enhanced stability of European standards
and institutions as compared with the time when these countries joined.
Then the European standards and institutions in the area of banking and
monetary policy were largely in the process of being created, and grad-
ual adjustment was the only possible approach.
The Croatian central bank law is on the whole harmonised with
European standards to do with the definition of the objective of the cen-
tral bank (low inflation), the availability of monetary policy instruments
(prohibition on direct loans to the government) and the degree of cen-
tral bank independence (total independence of the executive and limita-
tion on the power of parliament to appoint and discharge the governor
and his/her associates). For this reason it is necessary to resist any pos-
sible attempt to make inroads upon this standard, unless they are direct-
ed towards further strengthening of the independence of the central
bank. The reasons for this should not be only of a formal and Eurocen-
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tric nature; it always needs remembering that genuine central bank inde-
pendence and low inflation belong among the basic, fundamental stan-
dards of modern market-economy democracies in Europe. Giving up on
this standard will open up the Pandora’s box of possible inflation, the
harmfulness of which has been shown in this part of the world much
more often than its rather dubious social benefits. 
However, where banking and financial services in general are
concerned, toughness in the standards that the applicant countries are
expected to respect is much weaker than in the area of central banking
regulation and the monitoring of macroeconomic indicators. The situa-
tion in the area of commercial banking is like that in the area of central
banking of some 10 or 12 years ago. In general it can be said that the
European standards are shown in a series of details of legislative solu-
tions and byelaws and regulations. However, more important than the
understanding of the regulatory particularities (to be discussed below) is
the understanding that the possibility of the financial system’s acting in
line with European regulatory approaches depends on the degree of its
development and its ability to withstand competition on the open market.
From this point of view the Croatian banking system can be considered
mature and competitive. This is reflected primarily in the amount of and
trends in interest rates (Table 1). Other financial services providers, espe-
cially the pensions and investment funds have figured in any strength on
the Croatian market only in the last two years, but the character and per-
formance of their operations suggest a probable parallel evolution with
the banking system, i.e., rapid convergence with EU criteria. Unlike the
banks, these are financial services that previously did not exist in
Croatia. Since there is no burden of entrenched institutions and regulato-
ry approaches, from the very beginning they have been able to make use
of approaches that are in line with international standards.
As for the investment and pensions funds, the European regula-
tions have still not been rounded off, although with a fair degree of con-
fidence it can be expected that some of the regulatory solutions will
soon become obligatory on our funds industry as well. Perhaps the most
important regulatory standard is GIPS, the Global Investment Perfor-
mance Standard, which governs the transparent manner of comparing
fund performance (manner and frequency of calculating the value of the
fund, consolidation of similar funds run by the same management and
determination of benchmarks, numerical criteria for performance com-
parison). Since this is not a standard that springs from the process of
European unification but a standard that has been adopted, domestic
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regulators (the Securities Commission) should start the process of
importing it into the domestic market as soon as possible. In a similar
manner, application of regulatory principles from Basel II should facil-
itate convergence of the standards framework for the banking industry
on EU criteria.ii
Measurable financial indicators of harmonisation in standards
constitute important criteria, but analysis of convergence with the EU
has to go a step further and look more profoundly into the structure
of the financial system, for it is on this that competitiveness in the
European environment depends. In general, the degree of develop-
ment of banking services is shown by the relation between banking
assets and GDP. The figures in Table 3 show that Croatia is in the
group of the most developed European countries, in terms of the
banking industry, outside the EU. The Czech Republic has a consid-
erably lower ratio of bank assets and GDP, and Slovakia and Slove-
nia have a negligibly higher ratio, among the group of countries we
are comparing.iii It is also important to point out that a comparison
with the EU is not relevant, for this average is affected by banking
over-developed countries (especially Germany), in which there was a
belated development of the non-banking financial services industry
(primarily, investment and pensions funds) and of the share capital
market, so that the development of the banking system there made up
for the deficiencies in non-banking financial services providers. The
comparison in Table 4 reveals that countries like Greece lurk below
the European average, in which the banking system has not gone on
any further than the group of (in banking terms) most advanced appli-
cant countries, which Croatia is closing on. The ratio of banking
depth (bank assets/GDP) shows that in 1993 Greece had a banking
system at the developmental level of today’s Slovakia and Slovenia,
or only insignificantly above the other transitional countries with the
most advanced banking systems. On the other hand, it should be
borne in mind that this conclusion holds only in the comparison with
Greece. The next-least developed EU state, Portugal, had a banking
depth ratio of 132%, which is considerably more than today’s ratio in
the advanced transitional countries.
We can conclude that the banking systems in all the applicant
countries and in Croatia, but not in Bulgaria, Romania and Lithuania,
have reached the degree of development at which they can probably
withstand joining the EU system. The relevant historical comparison
that inevitably comes to mind to do with the ratio between banking
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assets and GDP is that with Greece. A comparison with the next least
developed EU country, Portugal, leads to the conclusion that there is a
great difference between the banking systems of today’s transitional
countries and that of Portugal in 1993.
In the context of the debate about the competitiveness of the
banking systems of the transitional countries, it is interesting to ob-
serve the shares of banks owned by foreign banks in total bank assets.
Slovenia and Romania are the only applicant countries in which the
share of the foreign banks did not, at the end of 2001, exceed 50%
(although there are clear indications that there too this share will be
reached very shortly). In all the other countries, this ratio is greater. In
the CR, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Croatia more than
three quarters of banking assets are in foreign-owned banks. The
internationalisation of the ownership structure will certainly make it
easier to include local banking systems in the financial structure of the
EU.iv Of course, debate about this necessarily enters the domain of
speculation, because EU standards do not prescribe the ownership
structures of the banks, and in the EU itself we meet, historically, very
different kinds of ownership structure. The ownership structures
shown in Greece and Portugal, where there is a negligible number of
banks influenced by foreign owners, are typical of a large group of EU
states. More recent comparisons, unfortunately, are impossible,
because of the absence of any internationally comparable data; how-
ever the statistical research carried out by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine
(1999) remains an invaluable source. In this dbase the data refer to
1997. On the basis of these data, it can be concluded that we can find
an ownership structure like that of Greece and Portugal in Italy,
Germany, Norway, Belgium, Sweden and Austria; it is necessary to
bear in mind that these data do not reflect the proprietorial influence
that the German banks have in Italy, nor the important changes that
have occurred in the last five years, among which one should pick out
the sale of Austria’s biggest bank – Bank Austria – to Germany’s
HVB, which has fundamentally changed the proprietorial structure of
the Austrian banking system. At the opposite pole, within the EU,
there are countries with a highly internationalised structure of owner-
ship in the banking system – Ireland, in which, as long ago as 1997,
66% of banks were foreign-owned, and Luxembourg, where foreign-
ers own 58%. The proportion of foreign-owned banks in the UK
varies constantly between 20 and 30% of total assets, while the corre-
sponding share in the Netherlands fell to 33% in 1996, after having
reached a maximum of 61% in 1992.v
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Although trends and experiences of individual countries are dif-
ferent, a comparison of the development of ownership structures in the
EU and in the transitional countries in the last ten years or so leads to
the conclusion that at essence what is concerned is a globalisation
process.
For this reason, the applicant countries will in the next few
years be faced with problems very similar to those obtaining in the
EU, which are:
• the incompleteness of the bank regulation system,
• the gradual exclusion of state ownership from the banking system, 
• the public perception of loss of sovereignty because of the appearance
of dominantly foreign ownership in the banking system.
• the accelerated development of non-banking financial services pro-
viders, particularly of the share capital market.
Country Bank assets / GDP Share of banks assets
(%) in foreign ownership
(%)
Bulgaria 43 70
Czech R. 125 78
Estonia 73 97
Hungary 68 61
Latvia 73 97
Lithuania 33 81
Poland 70 51
Romania 31 39
Slovakia 94 75
Slovenia 94 33
EU 200 n.a.
Greece 2000 115 n.a.
Greece 1993 92 3*
Portugal 2000 203 n.a.
Portugal 1993 132 3*
Croatia 84 82
* Data relate to 1997 (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999).
Source: Bank Austria Creditanstalt, International Financial Statistics, IMF, EBRD 
Transition Report
Table 3. Indicators of level of banking system development, 2001
Since the globalisation process that results in accelerated finan-
cial development and transformation in ownership is common to both
the countries of the EU and the applicant countries, the great struggle
between the common and the national institutions about authority for
the control of the banks within the EU is important for the peripheral
countries beyond the borders of the EU. This struggle is being waged
between the central banks, or the central supervisory agencies of the
EU states (depending on who at the national level is charged with bank
and other financial institution supervision) and the Eurocracy, which
still does not have a clear view about whether oversight at the EU level
should be carried out within the ECB, within the context of the inde-
pendent-centralised supervisory institution or whether a compromise
solution can be found, somewhere between centralising and national
aspirations. For the moment, supervision of the banks has remained
within national jurisdiction, but at Union level close international
cooperation among regulators and supervisors of banks has started,
because the operations of a single banks can no longer be supervised
only at the centre (as witnessed to by the depiction of the changes in
ownership structures and the increasing number of international agree-
ments between financial regulators). The outcome of this tension bet-
ween international and national control cannot at the moment be predi-
cted even within the EU, and so it is unpredictable with respect to this
country as well. In the words of a member of the Executive Committee
of the ECB, Mr Tomasso Padoa-Schiopa, stated during a July address
to the members of the Economic and Monetary Issues Committee of
the EP in 2002, the achievement of unified rules and practices of bank
supervision is the objective in the next three to four years. This is also
the deadline by which the application of Basel II starts in the regula-
tion of banks (see en ii), which, independently of the process of access-
ion, will lead to the unification of regulatory standards and procedures.
Accordingly, this is the temporal horizon within which there will cer-
tainly not be any consolidation of the supervisory authorities at the
Union level. Europe moves slowly, but surely; and it has left the final
answer to the question of regulatory sovereignty to the future political
process that is of great importance to us.
Further, it is certain today that the state owned banks in the EU
will not be able to obtain full licenses for all banking business. Since
any more significant impact of the state-owned banks, particularly the
state owned mortgage [hypothec] banks is felt precisely in Germany
and Austria, changes in ownership structures here will have direct and
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indirect impacts on banking in Croatia, through changes in the credit
rating or ownership of certain banks the branches of which do business
on our market. However, since the banks in the applicant countries are
mainly internationalised and privatised, or well on the way to so being,
some EU states will have much more difficulty in respect this EU norm
than the applicant countries.
More important than this will be changes in the public mood
with reference to “foreign banks”. That is, public attitudes to the EU,
globalisation and foreign ownership go, as a rule, through a number of
phases. Initial rapture is followed by revulsion and disappointment,
when the first problems appear, showing that there is no ideal system
(this phase started in Croatia after the Rijeka banka crisis, which at the
moment the scandal of foreign currency losses broke out was owned
by a German state-owned bank). If the public gets cold feet at loss of
sovereignty in the control of banks, it is easy to match this with argu-
ments about essentially easier interest rates and loan conditions in an
internationalised system and the vast costs that the taxpayer had to
stand in the “national” system. However, bearing in mind Croatian
political traditions, and the constant demand in them for stronger gov-
ernment interference in the economy, it is questionable whether any
political elite will have any interest in preserving the achieved open-
ness of the banking system if public pressure takes on greater dimen-
sions than those we have seen to date. In the next few years the atti-
tude of the public towards the opening of not only the banking system
but of all segments of economic and social life will have to be atten-
tively scrutinized. It is precisely in this attitude that the answer to the
question of the possible speed of Croatian convergence on EU stan-
dards lies.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAPITAL MARKET
The fourth problem common to the EU and the applicant co-
untries as well as Croatia relates to the inadequate development of the
share capital market. In placing their resources, banks endeavour to
minimise risks. The sources of resources of the banks are mainly not
permanent (apart from their capital and the few long-term deposits)vi,
but are medium-term and short-term, which means that the banks
have limited opportunities for term transformation as it is known for
the sake of placing long-term funds. From this it derives that the
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banks cannot be any kind of substitute for genuine investors, who do
not put their money into debts but into capital, and thus take on much
more risk, at the same time providing lasting resources for invest-
ment in corporate operations. In addition, trading in developed share
capital markets provides a transparent price for share capital, which
leads to its rapid migration from firms and sectors with low profit and
dividend levels into firms and branches with high profits and divi-
dends. This ultimately ensures the quality of the investment process
and stable economic growth. 
Although the share capital market is the core of capitalism, it
cannot develop spontaneously. The development of it requires delib-
erate government intervention through the provision of a legislative,
information and other infrastructure necessary for the functioning of
an effective market. In this area, Europe is behind the US, UK and SE
Asia, and the transitional countries have on the whole joined this old
and inglorious European tradition. After the fall of the Wall, not
enough attention was devoted to the development of the capital mar-
ket. Instead of providing the legal and other kinds of infrastructure
for the development of the market, the countries got directly involved
in the privatisation process, contributing to what we now refer to as
the crisis of “crony capitalism”, which has essentially put at risk the
credibility of the transition and capitalisation as the target system.vii
In the first phase, government officials endeavoured to avoid, or
carry out a very limited, allotment of shares. In the second phase,
under pressure of high budgetary deficits, they resorted to the sale of
the big state corporations to finance shortfalls in the budget. The
essential elements of the development of a capital market, such as the
passing of legislation, the establishment of capital market regulatory
institutions (Securities Commission, Agency for Protection of
Market Competition), privatisation of companies by private sale on
the market, the establishment of cheap and efficient platforms for
secondary trading all occurred sporadically and on the whole too
late.viii Thus we arrived at the situation as shown in Table 5. The data
show that Europe (as symbolised by Germany) is globally way
behind the US, that the applicant countries (with the exception of
Germany) range around the value of the indicator for Germany, while
Croatia is quite clearly behind everyone, including the advanced
applicant countries.ix
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Table 5. Indicator of degree of development of share capital market
There is a developed awareness in the EU of the importance of
developing the capital market, as well as the fact that the fragmented
national legislations and traditions are one of the main obstacles in the
way of the development of an effective European capital market. In its
action plan for financial services, worked out in 1999 and accepted in
2000, the EU mapped out the creation of a single European financial
market by 2005, which primarily relates to the capital market. Unlike
the EU, which has a clear target and determined deadlines, and unlike
the more developed transitional countries like Hungary and CR, whose
markets are relatively well developed for European conditions,
Croatiax, with one of the lowest ratios of market capitalisation, is right
at the margin of global changes. The reasons need to be sought at sev-
eral levels. First of all, privatisation in an unregulated environment,
which relied on the self-managing and centralised state model, and not
the model of allotment of shares, contributed to the dissemination of
distrust and a feeling of injustice. Ultimately, it was not possible to cre-
ate broad-based shareholding. Secondly, Croatia is a country that had
fallen behind the advanced applicant countries in economic and busi-
ness education, and understanding of the importance, manner of func-
tion and regulation of the capital market remained limited. Thirdly, in
the Croatian economic elite, there is still the tradition of direct market
intervention, which is not aimed at the developed of the market infra-
structure, rather at the suspension or replacement of market mecha-
nisms, which ultimately prevents the further development of a capital
Source: Daliæ (2002) and Šonje (2001)
Country Market capitalisation / GDP (%)
Czech R. 35
Hungary 56
Slovakia 24
Slovenia 27
Poland 17
Estonia 28
Lithuania 30
Latvia 7
Russia 26
Croatia 14
SAD 80
Germany 24
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market, because there is a tendency to look for alternative (administra-
tive) mechanisms for the allocation of capital. As for the deep and last-
ing developmental obstacles, at this moment it is not clear how and in
what period of time they can be overcome, and there is a danger that
the lack of development of the share capital market will be an essential
limiting factor in Croatian competitiveness during EU accession.xi
DEVELOPMENT OF THE
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
The process of the transition in this country is on the whole
understood as the process of the adjustment of standards to those of the
developed market economy democracies. It is not a rarity for politi-
cians (irrespective of party or background) to talk of changes in laws
and standards as if they were goals in themselves. This is perhaps the
reason why in Croatia, from the point of view of standards, there are
no insuperable gaps with the advanced applicant countries for the EU,
at least in the area of monetary policy and financial services. As we
have already pointed out a few times in this paper, convergence in stan-
dards is important, but it is not a crucially determining factor in con-
vergence with the EU, and hence we shall devote only a few lines to
specifically legal issues, not letting slip of the fact that issues of stan-
dards are not any problem at all at the moment when the economic
(structural), interest and socio-psychological lines of force are at work
in conformity with the standards in the EU. 
As already said, the CNB Law of 2001 is mainly harmonised
with EU standards. In the process of passing it, the opinions of experts
for central banking from the European Commission were made use of,
in order to widen the understanding of the necessity of accepting cer-
tain standards, which is the first case of the kind in our legislative prac-
tice, as far as money and banking are concerned. Very likely this is one
of the reasons why our Central Bank Law is already harmonised with
the main normative parameters of the European Commission.
The new Banks Law conforms to EU standards to such a level
that Croatia, with the amendments to this law and according to the def-
initions of some byelaws, certainly meets the requirements for EU
membership. It is harmonised with the directives of the EU related to
the starting of and carrying out the business of loan institutions, the
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rehabilitation and liquidation of loan institutions, annual and consoli-
dated report, capital adequacy and deposit security, to mention only a
few of the most important areas. Since by 2005 Basel II will start to be
applied, this will be an opportunity for a further step in convergence on
EU standards.
Of course, there are many legal approaches that contain provi-
sions that will have to be abolished or modified on the way to the EU
(Law concerning Loan Business with Foreign Countries, the Inland
Payments Clearing Law, the State Agency for the Security of Deposits
and the Rehabilitation of Banks Law), just as there are legislative areas
that are not sufficiently standardised in comparison with the EU (elec-
tronic financial business, security instruments, registers, regulation of
financial conglomerates). However, these are areas in which, without
any major problems, via laws or byelaws, convergence with EU can be
achieved within the period for joining.
The only serious open area is that of foreign currency opera-
tions. This area will be treated in a separate chapter, because the cur-
rent proposals for new solutions do not guarantee any progress on the
road towards the EU.
OPENNESS TO THE FLOWS OF
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
The degree of openness, and the dynamics of further opening
up, to the flows of international capital are the most important elements
of economic policy in a small and open country like Croatia. All the
financial issues that we considered in the previous chapters essentially
depend on how the country defines itself vis-à-vis international finan-
cial currents. An error in this area can cancel out the effects of an
excellent monetary and financial policy, but at the same time, the
effects of bad monetary and fiscal policies can largely annul an intelli-
gent policy of opening up to international capital. The reason for such
importance being ascribed to international financial flows is that for-
eign currency inflows and drains are a much more important determi-
nant of changes of money supply (which is to a large extent of foreign
origin), supply of loans, savings and economic activities than the mon-
etary policy of one’s own central bank.xii In other words, what for the
USA is represented by Fed actions is in Croatia foreign currency flows.
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Since in the EU accession process a greater degree of openness of the
Croatian economy is to be expected, the anyway already important for-
eign currency issues will become even more important, for which rea-
son they deserve a special place in this paper.
The current state of affairs in Croatia is such that we are very
open to influxes of international capital, which is fine. Direct foreign
investment and repatriation of profit have the same rights as domes-
tic investment, the influx of foreign currency deposits is unrestrict-
ed,xiii and firms, banks and the government can borrow at foreign
banks and on the international capital market. Certain forms of regu-
lation do exist to do with the purchase of real estate (foreign natural
persons can do this only with a special license) and of the usual
reporting for the sake of the foreign debt statistics and the prevention
of money laundering. On the outflow side, there are however many
barriers. Citizens and firms may not have accounts with foreign
banks (the corporate sector can, with special permission) or invest in
foreign securities, and direct investments abroad can be made only be
firms. The easy inflow and difficult outflow of capital make the cur-
rent system asymmetrical and irrational, and the possibilities for the
international diversification of portfolios are limited. In other words,
the regulation system is created in such a way as artificially to create
a larger supply of foreign currency in the country (and thus creating
artificial pressure for the currency to appreciate) than that which
would exist if the international currency flows were liberalised on the
outflow side as well. The causes of this state of affairs should be
sought in the heritage of the regulations from ex-Yugoslaviaxiv, in
which the foreign currency legislation was written in such a way as
to solve the constant problem of foreign currency shortage and to
enhance the spread of government control over the economy.
However, the inherited regulations are not very distant from the
standards that the EU at the moment requires from Croatia. During the
four years after the signing of the SAA, i.e., by 2006, Croatia has to
enable EU citizens free trade in land (apart form agricultural land,
forests, nature reserves and the maritime zone) on conditions identical
to those for Croatian citizens. Four years after the signing of the SAA,
Croatia has to enable free portfolio investment and transactions relat-
ing to financial loans in a period of up to one year. The other condi-
tions are already met in Croatia (convertibility on current account, free-
dom of direct foreign investment, free commercial loan transactions
with a maturity period of longer than a year).
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The conditions that the EU imposes on Croatia are similar to the
inherited regulations in that they still deal more with the inflow than
the outflow side. Probably this is one of the reasons because of which
the proposal of the new Foreign Currency Business Law, of May 2002
(http://www.hnb.hr/propisi) are still based on a sceptical point of view
with respect to liberalisation of international capital flows. The posi-
tive moves in the draft Law are mainly of a technical naturexv and the
only essential new departure is the possibility of buying foreign secu-
rities. However, this too is limited to the government bonds of OECD
countries, and it is hard to imagine any interest on the part of domestic
investors for securities with low yields and low risk, because there are
already plenty such securities and financial service providers that sup-
ply them (investment and pensions funds) on the domestic market. Still
open is the question of how much the possibility of prescribing the
lowest credit rating for foreign issuers whose bonds can be bought with
restriction by residents will employed. In essence, the new foreign cur-
rency law has retained most of the outflow restrictions of the old law
and in this way failed to inject some equilibrium into this sensitive part
of the economic regulations.
A similar spirit prevailed with respect to the ability of foreign-
ers to invest in Croatian securities. Non-residents may not invest in
cashier bills of the CNB or in treasury bills, but may in other securities
if the period maturity is longer than 6 months and if they retain them
to the maturity period. In addition, the CNB may prescribe restrictions
to do with terms and the possibility of making use of all short-term
securities (Art. 26, Draft Foreign Currency Business Law). This restri-
ction shows the nervousness of the government about the sudden
movement of non-residents into short-term securities, which could eq-
ually rapidly be turned into a sudden outflow of capital. However, this
fear is mainly without foundation, because:
• for quite a long time Croatia has had lower rates of interests and
worse credit ratings than the applicant countries in this area, which
means that short-term international money will probably give Croatia
the miss for quite some time to come (it will tend towards areas with
bigger yields and smaller risk), because at the moment there is no
indication of any changes in these relations;
• because of its size Croatia will probably never be a main speculative
target, for speculators for their operations required developed, large
and liquid markets with low transaction costs of trading in financial
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instruments. In much worse conditions, and with much higher inter-
est rates, in the second half of the nineties, Croatia was exposed to the
inflow of short-term capital, and this did not hurt it even then;
• the EU provides for the possibility that in the event of there being a
major menace to the exchange rate policy and the balance of pay-
ments restrictions may be introduced. For this reason it is a mystery
why restrictive measures and instruments have been incorporated into
the law when they can be regulated by byelaws should a crisis make
it necessary.
The possibility of intervening in the area of the freedom of the
flows of international capital fits in with the well-known McKinnon
theory (1991) of gradual liberalisation. It is important to note that the
views advanced here are not an advocacy of unconditional liberalisa-
tion, rather the question is raised as to why those who proposed the
new foreign currency law turned the reaction to an exceptional eco-
nomic situation into a system that is built into the law. A more liberal
wording of the law would not mean any ability to react to a crisis set
off by changes in international capital movements. In addition, the
beginning of the functioning of the economy in a financially liberated
environment in the phase when the government can still occasionally
intervene in the free market would be an important gain, because of the
possibility of getting people used to an environment of the kind that
awaits us in a few years time, but without the government being able
to rescind individual freedoms. In this way the outflow side remains
mainly closed, irrespective of the asymmetry that such a solution might
create in the currency market (a possible structural excess in the sup-
ply of foreign currency), while functioning in a liberalised environ-
ment has been deferred to the moment when such liberalisation will be
irreversible. We are perhaps missing a chance to get ready now for the
total liberalisation that awaits us on entry into the EU.
CONCLUSION 
Croatia can be satisfied with its tempo of convergence on the
EU to do with the narrowly defined monetary indicators: inflation,
interest rates and exchange rate. However, there is ground for concern
in the indicators of the financial deficit that takes us essentially away
from EU standards. The structure of the banking system, which is seen
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in interest margins and in the internationalisation of the ownership
structure, is very suitable for EU accession, and this evaluation can
also be applied to the other financial services providers, which are inte-
grated into the systems of international financial conglomerates.
Nevertheless, the share market is worrying undeveloped in Croatia,
and can in the long run be a serious developmental handicap which will
limit the competitiveness of the Croatian economy in the EU. For this
reason the creators of economic policy must undertake urgent actions
in this area. As for convergence on the EU in the area of standards, we
can be on the whole satisfied, especially with the central bank and
commercial banks laws. This evaluation does not apply, however, to
the area of foreign currency legislation. In this area a minimum of
progress has been recorded since the emergence from the former
Yugoslavia, and the draft of the new foreign currency law has let slip
the opportunity for convergence with EU standards. The economic and
financial systems will have gradually to adapt themselves to function-
ing in a liberalised environment. The retention of restrictive regula-
tions to the last moment marks this area as the key area of vulnerabili-
ty on the way to the EU. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
• Make use of the introduction of Basel II for the adjustment of
byelaws and regulations governing banking operations to the stan-
dards of the EU.
• Continue to affirm the independence of the central bank as an incon-
testable standard, and resist any unnecessary attempt to encroach
upon it with the aim of diminishing central bank independence.
• Essentially step up the activities of the Republic of Croatia Securities
Commission in the area of the European action plan for financial
services and the introduction of international standards into the funds
industry (GIPS, for example, the Global Investment Performance
Standard).
• Design and implement measure for a more rapid development of the
share capital market.
• Liberalise international capital flows, while retaining the possibility
to restrict them in exceptional crisis conditions, instead of the current
conception, according to which actual restrictions on international
capital flows are retained.
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i The ECB and the Eurosystem (ECB and the central banks of the states members of the
EMU) are not primarily political institutions and they have limited political influence.
However, their political importance may not be underrated, not only because of their
informal influence, but also because of the formal role of the ECB in making political
decisions in the EU. The ECB provides opinions to the European Commission when it
discusses financial and monetary issues, reports to the EP, and is directly involved in the
economic dialogue between the EU and the applicant countries. The economic dialogue
is coordinated by the European Commission. The objective of the economic dialogue is
an exchange of opinions with the applicant countries in the pre-accession phase and
preparation of them for reciprocal oversight procedures, which will be activated imme-
diately after EU entry. For this reason great importance needs attaching to the fact that
in the ECB Bulletin of July 2000, the following was written: In recent times, the parlia-
ments of Hungary and Poland have debated draft amendments to the central bank laws,
which would de facto reduce the degree of independence of the central banks.
Acceptance of any amendments that, in essence, weaken the capacities of the central
banks in their fight for price stability would give rise to serious concern in the EU acces-
sion process of these countries (ECB, July 2002). 
ii The expert group for bank control at the BSI in Basel is constantly working on the uni-
fication of the so-called best practices in the regulation of banking systems in order to
provide adequate and unified levels for the capital adequacy of the global banking sys-
tem, which particularly relates to large international banks. After the first guidelines of
1988, the implementation of the second lot of guidelines is expected from 2005 only. The
greatest changes being introduced refer to the acceptance of the influence of operational
risks in the calculation of the capital needed, and greater reliance on internal rating sys-
tems of banks in the evaluation of lending risks (BIS, 2001).
iii The differences with respect to CR and Slovakia need to be interpreted provisionally.
In the banking statistics of these countries, a good part of the bad assets are still shown
in the balance sheets, which distorts comparisons with countries such as Croatia, in
which banking balance sheets have been purged of bad assets. 
iv Reporting procedures in the banking system are adapted to EU standards. Internal
models for risk management and other operational procedures are on the whole adapt-
ed to EU standards under the influence of foreign owners and internal and external audi-
tors. In general, the operations of international banks and firms have very positive exter-
nal effects in the form of the spread of knowledge, procedures, business relations, moral-
ity and codes of conduct that prevail in the developed world. This effect need not be
overemphasised, however, since local know-how and culture are the dominant determi-
nations of the setting in which the foreigners are located. However, the influence should
not be underrated either.
v Data from Spain are not available in this dbase.
vi Interbank long-term loans need not be looked upon as long-term sources at the level
of the global consolidated banking system, because ultimately it can be financed only
with capital, quasi-capital and long-term non-banking deposits.
vii Crony capitalism means a system in which capital is not controlled by the most com-
petent who have managed to survive in the open market, but those who at the moment of
privatisation were closes to the government officials who allocated the capital or those
who through their influence on state intervention instruments managed to ensure better
operating conditions for their firms.
viii For example, the two key regulatory institutions mentioned in the text started to be
worked on in Croatia only in 1995/96, which means that the first phase of the transition
and privatisation was carried out in a de facto unregulated environment.
ix The numerator of the ratio is the market value of share capital of a company placed
on the stock exchange. 
x The data need interpreting with caution because there is no internationally compara-
ble and reliable dbase in which the share of capitalisation deriving from bonds is unam-
biguously set off from the part deriving from shares.
xi There is an alternative way of looking at the problem, taking off from the fact that
Croatia is too small to be able to develop an independent capital market to any great
extent. According to this viewpoint, the shares of the important firms will be quoted on
the international capital markets when the firms are mature enough for this step. It
would seem that the examples of Pliva and Zagrebacka banka speak in favour of this.
However, there is still the problem of the manner of arriving at fresh capital for medi-
um-sized firms that the international markets will not be interested in, or for which the
transaction costs of issuing new shares on the international market will be prohibitively
large.
xii This goes only for little countries. In big countries foreign currency inflows and out-
flows are relatively of lesser importance consider the GDP, and so the importance of
domestic monetary and fiscal policy is incomparably greater.
xiii Unless we count as restriction the not very sensible obligation for every transaction
worth more than 105,000 kuna, irrespective of whether it is in cash or not, has to be
reported to the Prevention of Money Laundering Office.
xiv The currently valid foreign currency law was written in 1993, in a hurry, and with a
single objective – the liberalisation of currency transactions (Article 8, Charter of the
IMF). This provision was formally accepted two years later for formal reasons (Croatian
had not yet settled its affairs with creditors relating to the debt inherited form the former
SFRY), but de facto acceptance of this obligation occurred in October 1993.
xv The areas are: 
1. governing the trade in gold in other instruments;
2. a liberal system of areas of direct foreign investment (no novelties, only the material
is simply and systematically arrange din one spot;
3. government of the issue, classification and sale of the so-called Global Depository
Receipts;
4. the government of the issue, classification and sale of foreign securities in the
Republic of Croatia;
5. the superfluity of the Loan Business With Foreign Countries Law;
6. the possibilities of making long-term loans to non-residents.
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